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CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF EU MEMBERSHIP: 
AN OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS 
- THE CROATIAN PERSPECTIVE1
Irena Andrassy*
Summary: This article gives an overview of the constitutional issues 
arising from Croatia’s EU accession negotiations. Corresponding to the 
current status of negotiations, a provisional overview is made, consist-
ing of the constitutional issues that are either already on the negotiat-
ing agenda or anticipated on the basis of the existing, internal legal 
analyses and/or the experiences of candidate countries from previous 
enlargements. They are divided into three groups: 1) constitutional 
issues which have arisen during the screening process and in sub-
sequent talks and negotiations with the EU on individual negotiating 
chapters; 2) constitutional issues which have not been directly raised 
in negotiations with the EU, but which Croatia needs to consider in the 
context of the overall preparations for EU accession; 3) the possible 
further constitutional implications of EU membership following the en-
try into force of the latest EU treaty reform. 
The article looks at how Croatia and the EU approach these constitu-
tional issues in the context of accession negotiations, especially having 
in mind the new procedural mechanisms (ie benchmarks) introduced 
by the EU into the process of negotiations. Different approaches are 
also determined by the type of constitutional issues: the sector-specif-
ic issues related to legislative alignment in certain areas of the acquis, 
which will be addressed in the course of negotiations on individual 
chapters, are distinguished in principle from the general constitutional 
issues related to fi nding the ‘right’ constitutional legal basis and for-
mula for Croatia’s accession to and effective functioning in the EU 
(where Croatia has to decide on its own on the need for constitutional 
adjustments and the manner of making them). 
In comparison with the previous EU enlargement round, the analysis 
shows that there are no signifi cant differences in Croatia’s accession 
negotiations with respect to the areas in which constitutional issues 
1  This article was originally prepared for and presented at the Conference ‘Constitutional 
Implications of EU Membership’, held in Zagreb on 20 April 2007. Due to further develop-
ments in accession negotiations between the EU and Croatia, as well as in the EU treaty 
reform over the past year, some segments of the text have been updated and revised ac-
cordingly.
* Irena Andrassy, MSc, Legal Adviser of the Chief Negotiator of the Republic of Croatia for 
Accession to the EU. The comments and views expressed are personal.  
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have been identifi ed. Croatia will be able to use the experiences of the 
‘new’ EU Member States, although there are no standard or best so-
lutions for adjusting the constitutional legal framework for EU acces-
sion. The fi nal list of all constitutional issues that Croatia will (have to) 
address before accession to the EU will directly depend on the results 
of negotiations as well as on wider legal and political deliberations 
that are expected to take place in Croatia in the coming period.    
Introduction
For a candidate country, preparations for EU membership entail 
the comprehensive adjustment of its whole legal, economic and admin-
istrative system. In order to fulfi l a plethora of political, economic, legal 
and administrative criteria and conditions, a candidate country has to 
go through a complex technical process of approximation of legislation 
and administrative capacity building, but also has to face substantial 
reforms and changes to its core state functions and competences. Since 
EU accession also implies a transfer of some constitutional powers to 
EU institutions, preparations for membership inevitably include certain 
constitutional preparations as well. All these constitutional and other 
necessary reforms will be tackled by Croatia in the course of accession 
negotiations. 
In terms of substantive negotiations - if judged by the number of 
exchanged negotiating positions between Croatia and the EU and the 
number of negotiating chapters in which the two sides have entered into 
more substantive talks - Croatia is now in an advanced phase of acces-
sion negotiations.2 Still, a complete list of all constitutional issues that 
Croatia will face before (and after) accession to the EU will only be known 
at the very last stage of negotiations, in some aspects directly depend-
ing on further developments and the results of technical negotiations. 
Therefore, at this stage of the process a provisional overview of expected 
constitutional issues has been made, consisting of issues that are either 
already on the negotiating agenda or anticipated on the basis of the exist-
ing, internal legal analyses and/or the experiences of candidate countries 
from previous enlargements. For the purpose of this overview, all existing 
and potential constitutional issues and implications have been divided 
into three groups:  
2  At the time of the Conference, Croatia was still in an early phase of negotiations, with 2 
negotiating chapters (25 - Science and Research; 26 - Education and Culture) provisionally 
closed and 4 others opened for negotiations. In July 2008 the number of formally opened 
chapters was 21, which is more than half of all negotiating chapters (three chapters are 
provisionally closed).
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I. Constitutional issues which have arisen during the screening proc-
ess and in subsequent talks and negotiations with the EU on individual 
chapters;
II. Constitutional issues which have not been directly raised in ne-
gotiations with the EU, but which Croatia already needs to take into con-
sideration at this stage of the accession process - eg general questions 
linked to EU accession, including the constitutional basis for accession; 
III. Possible further constitutional implications of EU membership 
following the entry into force of the latest EU treaty reform.  
I. Constitutional issues which have arisen during the screening 
process and in subsequent talks and negotiations with the EU on 
individual chapters 
The overview of constitutional issues arising in individual chapters 
has primarily been made on the basis of the screening results presented 
in the Screening Reports of the European Commission.3  
The so-called screening process, on the basis of which substantive 
negotiations between Croatia and the EU Member States are now being 
carried out, started in October 2005 and lasted for one year. It entailed a 
detailed analysis and assessment of the level of alignment of the Croatian 
legislation with the acquis communautaire, for the purpose of identifying 
questions that might occur during negotiations.  
In comparison with the previous round of EU enlargement, this time 
around the screening exercise has been much more elaborated and thor-
ough - not only because of the signifi cant evolution of the acquis (now 
divided into 35 chapters, 33 of which are screened), but also due to the 
EU’s stricter and more rigorous approach to accession negotiations. Dur-
ing screening, Croatia provided more than 20,000 pages of documents 
to the European Commission, explaining in detail Croatia’s current leg-
islative and institutional framework and assessing the areas in which 
changes would be needed for the full and effective implementation of the 
acquis in each individual negotiating chapter. 
This new methodology resulted in more detailed Screening Reports of 
the Commission and consequently in more extensive lists of adjustments 
of the Croatian legal system that the Commission considers necessary for 
Croatia’s accession to the EU. Among those, a number of constitutional 
issues have been identifi ed as well. Since the Commission Screening Re-
ports serve as the basis for the preparation of Croatia’s, and ultimately 
the EU’s, negotiating positions, these constitutional issues are expected 
to arise, or have already arisen, in the substantive phase of negotiations 
on individual chapters. They are presented in Table 1. 
3  See <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/croatia/screening_reports_en.htm>. 
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According to this overview, the list of potential constitutional issues 
does not seem to be too long. If compared with the candidate countries 
from the previous EU enlargement, there are no signifi cant differences 
with respect to the areas in which constitutional issues arise in Croatia. 
There are a number of recurring issues - in Croatia’s case understand-
ably refl ecting the features and specifi c qualities of the Croatian consti-
tutional system. In terms of scope of potential constitutional changes, 
Croatia could fi gure somewhere in between the countries with minimal 
EU amendments and those with a medium package of EU constitutional 
amendments.4 
 The main characteristics of the outlined constitutional issues can 
be analysed according to several factors: the type of constitutional provi-
sion and its relation to the acquis, the nature of the acquis regulating a 
particular area, the main initiator of constitutional changes, and the type 
of possible constitutional amendments. 
1. The European Arrest Warrant (Chapter 24). 
The implementation of the Framework Decision on the European Ar-
rest Warrant5 upon Croatia’s accession to the EU will require the possibil-
ity to extradite (surrender) Croatian citizens from Croatia to another EU 
Member State. This is currently prohibited by the Croatian Constitution, 
which makes the relevant constitutional provision incompatible with the 
acquis. Since Croatia will have to transpose the Framework Decision pro-
visions into its own legal system in order to apply them upon accession, it 
is reasonable to expect that the respective constitutional provision would 
have to be amended beforehand. Otherwise, the legal act transposing the 
Framework Decision, if fully aligned with the acquis, might be assessed 
as unconstitutional.6 
This potential constitutional change is directly linked to the legis-
lative alignment with specifi c provisions of the acquis, which a candi-
date country is obliged to make within a certain period before accession. 
Theoretically, if the national legislation, including the constitutional law 
(according to the ECJ’s jurisprudence), remained contrary to the EU leg-
islation, the acquis would take precedence in line with the principle of 
4  Anneli Albi, EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe (Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge 2005) 67-121. 
5  2002/584/JHA: Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States [2002] OJ L 190/1. 
6  Except if its entry into force could be linked to a constitutional amendment. Consequent-
ly, it is diffi cult to provide to the EU the envisaged date of full alignment with the acquis 
or the adoption of a certain implementing act which, if adopted before the constitutional 
change, would be contrary to the Constitution (eg an act transposing the provisions from 
the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant).
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supremacy. But the situation is more complicated when the incompatible 
piece of legislation is the Constitution itself, because this could lead to 
internal debates on constitutional supremacy and the relationship be-
tween the EU’s and national constitutional systems in general.7 So, in 
order to avoid long constitutional debates, as well as potential ECJ cases 
and challenges to the constitutionality of national laws and regulations, 
the more pragmatic approach would be to change the Constitution prior 
to EU accession.8   
In this case, Croatia and the Commission/EU could agree on amend-
ments to the Croatian Constitution to prevent any potential confl icts with 
the acquis. As to how this should be done, there are different models to 
follow - from countries which generally allow the extradition of their citi-
zens, to those which allow it only for the purposes of implementing their 
international and/or EU obligations.  
2. The independence of the Croatian National Bank (CNB) (Chapter 17). 
Unlike the previous case, Croatia and the Commission/EU might 
not necessarily share the same views when it comes to the constitutional 
provision on the CNB and its compatibility with the acquis. Whereas the 
Commission expressed the opinion in its 2006 Screening Report that the 
wording of Article 53 of the Constitution, in the then existing legal context, 
was not compatible with the EC Treaty and the ESCB Statute, because it 
supposedly did not guarantee the central bank’s full independence, one 
could argue that this very general article of the Constitution is not in di-
rect confl ict with the acquis and that its ‘adequacy’ should be subject to 
interpretation, including through the relevant law on the CNB. Namely, 
since according to the Constitution the status, rights and obligations of 
the CNB are regulated by law, it could be claimed that the constitutional 
provision is given its full meaning only if read together with the CNB Act, 
which defi nes in more detail the nature and scope of the operational, 
functional and personal independence of the CNB. Thus, it would not be 
necessary to amend the constitutional provision, but to fully align the 
CNB Act. In this way, the constitutional provision could be interpreted 
and assessed in the new legal context of the fully aligned CNB Act (which 
was adopted in June 2008) and the actual practice on the ground, which 
could remove all uncertainties and doubts that the CNB’s full independ-
ence might be threatened by Parliament’s infl uence.9   
7  Unless this question is fully resolved by the explicit recognition of the supremacy of EU 
law over constitutional law, which is not (yet) the case in the Croatian Constitution.  
8  Some new Member States left this issue unresolved, which resulted in constitutional con-
fl icts, court cases and subsequent constitutional changes after accession to the EU.    
9  This approach has been taken in some Member States (like Slovenia and Finland).
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Given the above, further talks and discussions between Croatia and 
the EU on this issue are being held under Chapter 17 - Economic and 
Monetary Policy (which was opened for negotiations in December 2006). 
3. The purchase of real estate by foreigners (Chapter 4). 
This issue is potentially very similar to the one explained under point 
2, because it is also related to legislative alignment with the acquis, while 
the ‘pressure’ to change the Constitution, and not only the relevant laws, 
comes from the Commission (not Croatia). Namely, in the Commission’s 
opinion, full alignment with the acquis in this area would also necessitate 
an amendment of the Constitution, even though the constitutional provi-
sion is in principle permissive, ie allowing - and not prohibiting, as was 
the case in some previous candidate countries - foreigners to acquire real 
estate in Croatia. 
Since the purchase of real estate by foreigners will certainly be 
one of the most sensitive issues in Croatia’s accession negotiations, 
the resolution of this constitutional issue will directly depend on the 
negotiating positions of Croatia and the EU, and ultimately on the ne-
gotiation results (the present constitutional provision can, for example, 
cover possible transitional periods for certain types of real estate, such 
as agricultural land, and/or the permanently maintained restrictions in 
line with the acquis in relation to third countries). In other words, an 
unconditional constitutional provision would essentially not be legally 
feasible if negotiations with the EU resulted in a transitional period for 
the acquisition of a certain type of real estate, at least for the duration 
of that period. Hence, one could argue that there is enough room to 
interpret the current constitutional provision in line with the acquis, 
so it can remain unchanged, provided that all restrictions that are not 
compatible with the acquis, and are not accepted by the EU in negotia-
tions, are removed from the relevant laws or are not applied to EU/EEA 
nationals. 
4. Independence of the State Audit Offi ce (SAO) (Chapter 32). 
This constitutional issue is rather different from the previous ones 
because: a) it includes the request to provide the State Audit Offi ce with 
a legal basis in the Constitution in order to strengthen the SAO’s position 
and independence, ie to create a new constitutional provision in the area 
in which it currently does not exist; b) unlike the previous three cases, 
this question is not directly regulated by explicit rules within the acquis, 
thus constitutional amendment is not required for legislative alignment 
with the hard acquis, but is only advisable as an additional guarantee of 
institutional independence in line with some best EU practices and rec-
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ommendations;10 c) the ‘pressure’ for constitutional change comes from 
both Croatia and the Commission/EU.11 
After the formal opening of negotiations on Chapter 32 (in June 2007), 
this issue has been a subject of bilateral consultations, since further 
strengthening and safeguarding of the State Audit Offi ce’s independence 
- through constitutional provisions and/or other appropriate legislative 
amendments - has been indicated by the EU as one of the requirements 
for the provisional closure of this chapter.  
5. EU citizens rights - the right to vote and stand as a candidate in 
municipal elections in Croatia (Chapter 23). 
The Constitution currently guarantees the right of suffrage and 
participation in local/regional self-government to Croatian citizens only, 
linking it primarily to the principle of nationality/citizenship.12 At the 
same time, one could argue that the existing constitutional provision 
does not prohibit the extension of this right to EU citizens, so it could 
be expanded (and applied from accession) through relevant laws to all 
EU citizens residing in Croatia, without necessarily involving a constitu-
tional change. However, due to the wider context,13 Croatia may decide 
to amend the relevant constitutional provisions in the process to prevent 
any ambiguities in their interpretation or potential debates about the 
relationship between the provisions of the Constitution and the EC/EU 
Treaty.
As presented in Table 2, we can note that all fi ve explained constitu-
tional issues are marked by a different combination of factors. However, 
the main underlying factor, which might determine the actual need for 
constitutional change, is the legal necessity of that change to ensure the 
full alignment of Croatia’s legislation with the acquis in a certain area. 
      
10  The existing constitutional models and traditions of EU Member States are all quite dif-
ferent in that respect. 
11  The initiative initially came from the SAO, but was also welcomed and supported by 
the Commission/EU; see the Screening Report on Chapter 32 and the Commission’s 2006 
Progress Report <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/croatia/key_documents_en.htm>.
12  The defi nition of ‘citizens’ referred to in Article 132 of the Constitution is actually pro-
vided in the Act on the Election of Members of Representative Bodies of Units of Local and 
Regional Self-government, which stipulates that Croatian citizens above the age of 18 elect 
members of the representative bodies of municipalities, towns and counties (in which they 
reside) and have the right to stand in the elections for such bodies. This right is based on 
direct, equal and general voting rights, which are guaranteed under Article 45 of the Con-
stitution to Croatian citizens above the age of 18.  
13  The combination of Articles 45 and 132 and some other provisions of the Constitution.
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Given the above analysis, it is clear that Croatia will have to embark 
on some constitutional changes in order to prepare for EU membership. 
However, in terms of negotiations, the actual treatment and approach to 
these constitutional issues might be different in each of the presented 
cases, also depending on whether or not they (will) occur in the EU’s 
negotiating positions as explicit or implicit conditions for the provisional 
closure of individual chapters.   
 Against this background, the question is how a candidate country 
can approach the constitutional issues in the context of the accession 
negotiations. 
The Constitution is a fundamental national legal act which deter-
mines the organisation of a state and its government, the state institu-
tions and the division of their powers, as well as human and fundamental 
rights. It is a very specifi c legal and political document, and is the basis of 
the state’s legal and political system. Hence, any discussion on potential 
changes brings to the fore very sensitive and complex legal questions, 
and, no less importantly, some very political questions as well. Given its 
fundamental nature, it is generally considered that the Constitution can-
not be subjected to the ‘ordinary’ process of legislative alignment with the 
acquis or to too many and too frequent changes. It is diffi cult, not to men-
tion legally highly controversial, to change the Constitution very often. 
Based on this understanding, the preferred scenario would be for 
Croatia to gain an overall picture of all the necessary constitutional 
changes before embarking on them. The possibility to treat the consti-
tutional amendments in a comprehensive manner has the advantage of 
not having to tackle such a sensitive issue on several occasions. Under 
ordinary circumstances, the fi rst opportunity to have a full overview of 
all the required constitutional changes would be the fi nalisation of nego-
tiations in all the negotiating chapters. However, the new mechanism of 
closing benchmarks might create situations in which Croatia would not 
be able even to provisionally close a negotiating chapter before a consti-
tutional change takes place. Since this would bring more uncertainty 
into the negotiating process and potentially create the need for repeated 
constitutional changes, it would be preferable not to have the provisional 
closure of individual chapters conditioned by the adoption of constitu-
tional amendments (ie not to have constitutional questions as part of the 
closing benchmarks). If really needed, ie in the case where constitutional 
change is related to legislative alignment with the hard acquis and/or the 
elimination of a potential constitutional confl ict with the acquis, a com-
promise formula could be found in the obligation to carry out necessary 
constitutional amendments by the time of the signing of the Accession 
Treaty or at the latest by accession, but not before the provisional closure 
of a chapter.
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At this moment, it is still not entirely clear how the EU will approach 
all the mentioned constitutional issues during negotiations with Croatia, 
although indications exist based on the opened Chapters 17 and 32. Re-
garding CNB independence (Chapter 17), the EU is asking Croatia, in the 
form of a closing benchmark, to align its legislative framework in order to 
ensure the full independence of the central bank and its full integration 
into the ESCB. The Constitution is not explicitly mentioned, but given 
the Commission’s opinion expressed in the respective Screening Report, 
it can be implied as an element of discussions between Croatia and the 
EU. In Chapter 32, on the other hand, a more direct link has been made 
by the EU between the provisional closure of the Chapter and potential 
constitutional changes aimed at safeguarding the State Audit Offi ce’s in-
dependence (although a slightly different, alternative approach to this 
issue has also been offered as an option).      
Although it seems that the Commission/EU has not (yet) taken a 
consistent position on the treatment of constitutional issues in negotia-
tions with Croatia, it is possible to expect that the closing of negotiations 
could in some way be linked to constitutional changes. In view of the 
common understanding of the political and legal sensitivity of consti-
tutional changes, and bearing in mind the legal formality of the clos-
ing benchmarks which need to be fulfi lled by Croatia and then verifi ed 
by the EU in order to close a chapter, it would be sensible for the EU, 
when deliberating on benchmarks, at least to make a distinction between 
the constitutional changes ‘necessary’ for legislative alignment and those 
which are not legally required but only advisable or prudent as additional 
guarantees, whereby in the latter case closing benchmarks would not be 
imposed, especially where particular elements of a constitutional nature 
could be resolved or interpreted in line with the acquis through laws or 
by courts. 
II. Constitutional issues which have not been directly raised in 
negotiations with the EU, but which Croatia already needs to take 
into consideration at this stage of the accession process - eg general 
questions linked to EU accession, including the constitutional basis 
for accession 
In contrast to the constitutional issues described above, where align-
ment with the acquis in preparation for EU membership is the main un-
derlying factor for the potential constitutional change, there are a number 
of constitutional issues that Croatia has to decide on entirely autono-
mously. In principle, they are not directly related to legislative alignment 
with the acquis in specifi c negotiating chapters (although there are links 
with some of the chapters), but they arise from the very fact that Croatia 
is acceding to the EU, that is, to a very specifi c legal and political system 
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in which it will have to function effectively and in accordance with the 
fundamental political and legal principles on which the EU is based. For 
the purpose of this paper, an overview is presented below of some of the 
main questions that might belong to this category:    
• The constitutional basis for Croatia’s EU membership - the ques-
tion of how to accede to the EU: will one of the existing legal bases 
be used (Article 139, Article 141) or will a completely new legal 
basis be adopted? 
Directly depending on this decision is the choice of a ‘proper’ legal 
basis for the potential organisation of a referendum on EU membership. 
• A referendum on EU membership in Croatia - Article 86, Article 
141, or a new legal basis? 
• The legal force, position and application of EU legislation in the 
Croatian legal system - Article 140 of the Constitution14 does not 
completely solve the question of the supremacy and direct effect 
of primary and secondary sources of EU law; the Constitution is 
silent on the issue of the legal force and effect of legal acts of in-
ternational organisations to which Croatia can transfer powers de-
rived from the Constitution through an international treaty based 
on Article 139, para 2;
• The question of regulating the relationship between Croatia’s leg-
islative, executive and judicial branches of power under EU mem-
bership conditions, enabling their participation in the EU while 
maintaining the effi ciency of their work in Croatia (Articles 112 
and 11715). 
Especially pertinent here is the question of Parliament’s role in mon-
itoring the executive branch when representing Croatia at the EU level 
(in legislative and political decision-making in the Council and the Euro-
pean Council, including, for example, in the ESDP area). Experience with 
the National Committee in accession negotiations shows the increasing 
interest of the legislative branch in Croatia in monitoring the work of the 
executive branch (all EU Member States have different experiences with 
this issue and provide us with various examples and models). 
• The status of EU nationals in Croatia in general, and ensuring 
their EU citizenship rights, including the right to vote in elections 
14  Article 140 of the Croatian Constitution reads: ‘International agreements concluded and 
ratifi ed in accordance with the Constitution and made public, and which are in force, shall 
be part of the internal legal order of the Republic of Croatia and shall be above law in terms 
of legal effects. Their provisions may be changed or repealed only under conditions and 
in the way specifi ed in them or in accordance with the general rules of international law’. 
Thus, the Constitution may still prevail over international, and potentially European, law. 
15  Article 112 of the Constitution regulates the Government’s executive powers, while Ar-
ticle 117 determines the judicial powers exercised by courts. 
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for the European Parliament and to participate in local elections 
in Croatia (eg Articles 45 and 132 of the Constitution) - the latter 
issue is explained above under Chapter 23 - Judiciary and Funda-
mental Rights; 
• The defi nition of sovereignty (Article 2);16
• The procedure for sending the armed forces over Croatian bor-
ders (Articles 7 and 8217) - a question linked to the effectiveness of 
Croatia’s participation in the CFSP/ESDP. 
While sector-specifi c constitutional questions will be addressed in 
negotiations with the EU on individual chapters, the more fundamental 
constitutional issues are ultimately left to Croatia to decide on its own. 
This will be done after careful internal analysis at expert and political lev-
els, which could lead to constitutional amendments that are assessed as 
necessary or useful. Hence, they will primarily be the subject of ‘domes-
tic’ negotiations and exchanges of views within political, academic and 
expert circles deliberating on such constitutional changes with a view to 
reaching as wide a consensus as possible.   
Since there were other contributions at the April 2007 Conference 
discussing in detail the issue of the constitutional legal basis for Croatia’s 
accession to the EU and the related question of an EU referendum in 
Croatia, only a few general remarks in this respect are made here.  
In the last enlargement round, some countries did not have the con-
stitutional possibility and/or an adequate legal basis for EU accession or 
any delegation of powers to international institutions. Consequently, they 
had to create them. This is not the case in Croatia. On the contrary, judg-
ing by the existing views one could conclude that there is more than one 
possible legal basis in the Constitution for Croatia’s accession to the EU. 
At fi rst glance, this might seem like a simpler or more comfortable situa-
tion. However, it is hardly so, given the differences of opinions related to 
16  Article 2 provides a rather traditional defi nition of sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia 
as ‘inalienable, indivisible and non-transferable’. Although one could argue that this defi -
nition no longer corresponds to the changed perceptions and notions of sovereignty in in-
ternational relations, and especially in the context of EU development, there are examples 
within the EU where the Member States, particularly those from Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, have preserved similar, and even stricter, defi nitions and safeguards on sovereignty 
for historical reasons (see in Albi, n 4). On the other hand, some Member States have, again 
for historical reasons, expressly envisaged limitations of their sovereignty (eg Italy). Others 
(like Slovenia) have foreseen transfers of the exercise of part of their sovereign rights to 
international organisations.  
17  Under Article 7 of the Constitution, the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia may 
cross its borders or act over its borders only upon a prior decision of the Croatian Parlia-
ment passed by a two-thirds majority of all representatives in line with Article 82 (except 
in exercises within international defence organisations and in order to offer humanitarian 
aid, where the prior consent of Parliament is not necessary). This issue also has relevance 
for Croatia’s NATO membership.  
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which of these possibilities is the ‘correct’ one. Namely, the current con-
stitutional provisions, due to their general nature and width on the one 
hand (Articles 86 and 139), or their specifi c nature on the other (Article 
141 on association in state alliances), lead to different interpretations in 
legal and political circles in Croatia about which Constitution article is 
the appropriate legal basis for EU accession. Some even question whether 
either of them is the appropriate one. Moreover, the issue becomes even 
more sensitive when one takes into account that the choice between the 
existing constitutional bases for EU accession directly affects the manner 
in which the EU referendum could or should be organised in Croatia.  
Having to choose between a couple of possibilities raises the ques-
tion of how the EU, and Croatia’s accession to it, should be understood 
and defi ned, so as to match this understanding with what is offered in 
the Constitution. Should Croatia’s accession to the EU be treated as an 
association in an alliance with other states (Article 141 of the Constitu-
tion) or as accession to an international organisation through an interna-
tional treaty, which grants the international organisation powers derived 
from the Constitution (Article 139)?18
(Un)fortunately, fi nding a common defi nition of the European Un-
ion is almost impossible, the numerous existing defi nitions being quite 
diverse and imprecise and not corresponding to traditional notions and 
divisions between states and international organisations. From being 
viewed as an ‘ordinary’ international organisation or an international or-
ganisation to which sovereign rights and powers are transferred, to be-
ing considered as a supranational organisation or integration sui generis 
resembling a federation, the EU is a real ‘battlefi eld’ of different ideas 
and ideals, often depending on the perceptions and attitudes of politi-
cians and academics towards more or less integration or transfer of state 
sovereignty. From the perspective of accession negotiations - having in 
mind that EU accession is based on an international ‘accession’ treaty - it 
could be interpreted that a country is acceding to an international treaty 
organisation to which it transfers some of its constitutional powers. From 
the perspective of a Member State, the functioning of the EU does some-
times more resemble a state than an intergovernmental organisation. So, 
how is a future Member State to reconcile these two realities in its Con-
stitution? 
A signifi cant number of both old and new EU Member States, when 
acceding to the EU and ratifying their Accession Treaties, have used their 
constitutional provisions concerning the ratifi cation of international trea-
ties or those enabling the transfer of powers to international institutions 
(or specifi cally to the EC/EU). Some of them did not have those provi-
18  There are even views that these two Articles should be applied cumulatively. 
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sions beforehand, but had to amend their constitutions accordingly prior 
to EU accession. Croatia’s Constitution already contains similar (general, 
not EU-specifi c) provisions in Articles 139 and 140 (Title VII Interna-
tional Relations), with para 2 of Article 139 requiring a large majority in 
the Croatian Parliament for the ratifi cation of international treaties that 
grant the international organisation powers derived from the Constitu-
tion (potentially, for example, the EU Accession Treaty).19 
On the other hand, some legal experts in Croatia hold the view that 
Croatia should accede (and hold a referendum) on the basis of Article 
141 of the Constitution, interpreting thereby that by acceding to the EU 
Croatia is associating into an alliance with other states.20 Due to the lack 
of any precise defi nition of the term ‘associating in alliance with other 
states’ or its specifi c meaning used in Article 141, such wide interpreta-
tions of both Article 141 and the EU are perhaps theoretically possible, 
but as an important counterargument one should recall the very specifi c 
intention of this Article, which is particularly refl ected in its paragraph 
2 (prohibition to initiate any procedure for the association of the Repub-
lic of Croatia into alliances with other states if such association leads, 
or might lead, to a renewal of a South Slav state community or to any 
Balkan state form of any kind), as well as the time and rationale of its 
drafting (probably not intending to encompass accession to the European 
Community/European Union).21  
A carefully chosen option and a widely accepted position on the ap-
propriate legal basis for the possible organisation of a referendum in the 
context of EU accession are especially important if one bears in mind 
that, in comparison with the already quite demanding general provisions 
on referenda in Article 86,22 Article 141 stipulates an even larger majority 
of votes needed for a successful referendum,23 in addition to a compli-
cated procedure which entails a previous decision of the Croatian Parlia-
19  According to Article 139, para 2 of the Constitution, for the ratifi cation of international 
treaties that grant an international organisation powers derived from the Constitution, a 
two-thirds majority of votes of all representatives is needed, ie the same majority as re-
quired for constitutional amendments.   
20  Article 2 additionally stipulates that the Republic of Croatia ‘may conclude alliances with 
other states, retaining the sovereign right to decide by itself on the powers to be transferred 
and the right freely to withdraw from them’.
21  An interesting comparison can be made with the Slovak Constitution, which contains a 
provision on entrance into ‘state alliances’ that has generally been interpreted as intended 
for closer relations with the Czech Republic, and not for EU accession.   
22  At such referenda (eg on issues considered important for the independence, unity and 
existence of the Republic of Croatia), the decision shall be made by the majority of voters 
who have voted, provided that a majority of the total number of electors have taken part in 
the referendum.  
23  Any decision concerning the association of the Republic of Croatia shall be made in a 
referendum by a majority vote of the total number of electors in the State.
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ment and a mandatory referendum (while a referendum under Article 86 
is only optional, subject to a political decision). 
Current political attitudes towards the potential holding of an EU 
membership referendum in Croatia are refl ected in the Croatian Parlia-
ment’s declarations and resolutions,24 which stipulate that Croatian citi-
zens will decide on accession to the EU at a referendum that must be held 
before the signing of the Accession Treaty, ie following the conclusion of 
negotiations. The legal basis for such a referendum has not been speci-
fi ed, although it seems that a political decision to hold a referendum has 
already been made.25   
Against this background, and not only to facilitate the successful 
holding of an EU referendum, some would argue that a comprehensive 
reform of the referenda system and the corresponding constitutional pro-
visions is necessary. The reform could stretch from the general changes 
of thresholds and the voting majorities necessary for the passing of any 
referendum (both in Articles 86 and 141) or EU referenda in particular, to 
introducing consultative referenda or expressly limiting mandatory refer-
enda only to certain topics and situations (leaving, for example, EU issues 
outside its scope). A combination of all these options is also possible.   
In any event, a detailed analysis of the relevant constitutional and 
other legal provisions is needed in order either to establish the appropri-
ate legal basis for EU accession and for carrying out a referendum on EU 
membership on the basis of existing constitutional provisions (such as 
Articles 86, 139 or 141), or to assess the possible need to adjust them to 
the specifi c nature of the EU and Croatia’s accession to it.  
Regarding the latter option, it is possible to consider, as a com-
promise solution, the introduction of a special ‘EU clause’ or an entire 
‘EU title’ (as in France or Romania) into the Constitution. In addition 
to the questions of the legal bases for EU accession and a referendum, 
this clause or title could encompass other constitutional provisions con-
cerning EU matters which it would be advisable to explicitly incorpo-
rate in the Croatian Constitution for the purposes of EU membership (eg 
Croatia’s participation in European integration; the continuous transfer 
of executive, legislative and judicial powers to EU institutions, including 
in the area of concluding international agreements; recognition of the 
supremacy and direct effect of EU law; ratifi cation/approval of further 
amendments to the EU treaties, etc). The drafting of such an ‘EU clause/
24  Eg Declaration of the Croatian Parliament on the fundamental principles of negotia-
tions on full membership of the Republic of Croatia in the European Union (January 
2005); Resolution of the Croatian Parliament on the strategic guidelines for negotiations 
between Croatia and the EU (October 2005). 
25  There has been evident infl uence from the last enlargement round in which all new 
Member States, except Cyprus and Bulgaria, held referenda on EU membership. 
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title’ is a complex exercise since it needs to be adjusted to Croatia’s over-
all constitutional framework and to be compatible with the EU’s legal 
framework, which differs from national and international law. This would 
require further constitutional analysis in Croatia, whereby the Constitu-
tions of individual Member States, which contain EU clauses and titles, 
could be analysed and used as an inspiration. 
The experiences of both old and new Member States, as well as aca-
demic analyses, show that it is recommendable for a Member State to 
have its participation in the European integration process, ie EU devel-
opment, refl ected in the Constitution. This can particularly help to avoid 
the following situations:  
• Ambiguities and different interpretations of constitutional provi-
sions;  
• Constitutional and other courts coming into confl ict with the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice regarding the application of the acquis, or 
discussions about which law has precedence - the national Consti-
tution or EU law - in the case where the Constitution is in contra-
diction with the acquis;
• Repeated discussions on the EU’s nature and the implications of 
EU membership, and ways to ratify further EU treaty amendments 
which occur from time to time since EU integration is a continuous 
process, implying the continuous transfer of powers to the EU.   
III. Possible further constitutional implications of EU membership 
following the entry into force of the latest EU treaty reform 
Croatian accession negotiations started in the midst of the EU Mem-
ber States’ attempts to carry out the most comprehensive constitution-
al/institutional/treaty reform of the EC/EU since its establishment, but 
which was put into question after two negative referenda and the conse-
quent failure to ratify the Constitutional Treaty. For almost two years, 
this situation affected Croatia’s accession negotiations, both politically, 
because the atmosphere within the EU was not conducive to further en-
largement, and legally, since it was not clear on the basis of which Trea-
ty/Treaties Croatia would accede to the EU. In 2007, the Member States 
fi nally managed to move the stalled treaty reform forward, by convening 
the Intergovernmental Conference and agreeing on the ‘simpler’ Reform 
Treaty, which ‘only’ amends and does not replace the existing founding 
Treaties.26 After its signature in Lisbon on 13 December 2007, the Lis-
26  Many authors and commentators argue that the ‘simplifi ed’ Reform (Lisbon) Treaty end-
ed up being too complex and not entirely coherent, ie the exact opposite of what was in-
tended at the beginning of the reform process (Laeken Declaration). However, a similar line 
of criticism was, at the time, also used against the Constitutional Treaty by its opponents.  
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bon Treaty27 is currently undergoing the ratifi cation procedure in the EU 
Member States.28 
Although substantially very similar and largely based on the text of 
the Constitutional Treaty, it could be said that the Lisbon Treaty was, 
from the constitutional point of view, slightly ‘simplifi ed’. Namely, it was 
precisely the perceived ‘constitutional elements’ from the Constitutional 
Treaty - ie those directly connected to the understanding of sovereignty 
and statehood - that were intensely disputed during the IGC by some 
Member States who wanted them out of the Treaty due to their alleged 
‘quasi-constitutional’ symbolism.29 To avoid creating connotations with 
national Constitutions and/or to prevent the association of some Mem-
ber States with the creation of a ‘super-state’, certain ‘constitutional ele-
ments’ were ultimately left out of the Lisbon Treaty (or altered if compared 
with the provisions of the signed Constitutional Treaty), eg: a) concerning 
the ‘Constitutional Treaty’ title,30 the word ‘constitution’ was not retained 
in the title of the new Treaty; b) instead of the Union Minister for For-
eign Affairs, the old/new title of the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was accepted; c) the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the European Union was not incorporated into the 
Treaty, but was made legally binding (ie given the same legal value as the 
Treaties) ‘only’ through special reference to it in the Treaty;31 d) the fl ag 
and the anthem of the Union were no longer mentioned. 
Croatia was not invited to participate (as observer) in the Intergov-
ernmental Conference which prepared and adopted the Reform (Lisbon) 
Treaty. Like other candidate countries, it was only informed about the IGC 
deliberations and decisions.32 The opportunity to participate would have 
been a good catalyst for further internal deliberations and to raise aware-
ness in Croatia about the real constitutional implications of EU member-
ship, especially since the Lisbon Treaty contains some new (institutional) 
27  Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community [2007] OJ C 306. 
28  The Treaty was supposed to enter into force on 1 January 2009, provided that all the 
instruments of ratifi cation will have been deposited by that date. However, after the nega-
tive outcome of the Irish referendum held on 12 June 2008, this now seems unlikely. In-
stead, the Treaty will enter into force on the fi rst day of the month following the deposit of 
the instrument of ratifi cation by the last signatory State to take this step (Article 6 of the 
Lisbon Treaty). 
29  Eg the position of the Czech government; Bulletin Quotidien Europe, No 9401, 5 April 
2007, p 3.
30  Full title: Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.  
31  Revised Article 6 TEU. Specifi c provisions have been agreed for Poland and the UK - see 
Protocol on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to 
Poland and to the United Kingdom.  
32  In line with the European Council conclusions of June 2007.  
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elements which might raise certain constitutional legal questions33 (eg 
the enhanced role of national parliaments in the EU decision-making and 
legislative procedures; possible simplifi ed procedures for specifi c Treaty 
revisions; stronger references to the progressive establishment of a com-
mon defence; the explicit ‘exit clause’, ie the provision on the possibility 
of a ‘negotiated’ withdrawal from the EU). These new elements will have 
to be analysed in Croatia in order to assess their potential constitutional 
impact and to consider whether any constitutional modifi cations would 
be required in that respect.  
Considering that Croatia had given its political support to the Con-
stitutional Treaty and its principles,34 and that it expressed its commit-
ment to respecting all the values, common policies and goals on which 
the EU is founded,35 Croatia should not have diffi culties in accepting 
and acceding to the newly reformed Treaties. At the moment, however, 
the ratifi cation36 and implementation37 of the Lisbon Treaty still remain 
a challenge, although one would hope in Croatia that the Treaty would 
enter into force at least by the time Croatia’s accession negotiations are 
concluded and the Accession Treaty drafted. From both political and le-
gal points of view, this would seem like a clearer and simpler scenario, 
although legally Croatia could accede to the EU also on the basis of the 
existing Treaties.  
Conclusion 
Based on the screening results, exchanged negotiating positions, and 
initial legal analyses at this stage of accession negotiations, a number of 
constitutional issues have been identifi ed in relation to which Croatia will 
have to make more detailed constitutional analyses in order to examine 
the need to change the Constitution and the manner to do this in each 
particular case. In this exercise, it will be important to take into account 
the specifi c features of each individual question and decide on the most 
appropriate approach to potential constitutional changes, if and where a 
33  As this was already the case in some Member States, eg Belgium, France, Ireland. 
34  Through a separate statement at the signing ceremony in Rome on 29 October 2004.
35  Statement by the Croatian Parliament and the Government on joint actions in the proc-
ess of negotiations on EU membership, 19 January 2005. <www.sabor.hr>. 
36  More than 20 Member States have ratifi ed the Treaty by now and the ratifi cation process 
is continuing, despite the Irish ‘no’ vote. After initial consultations with the Irish govern-
ment and analyses of the situation, the June European Council agreed to come back to the 
ratifi cation issue at its October meeting in order to consider the way forward.   
37  While awaiting ratifi cations, internal preparations to ensure the effi cient application 
of the Lisbon Treaty novelties (as soon as it enters into force) have begun within the EU 
institutions. However, more open and detailed discussions on the actual implementation 
of the new Treaty can probably be expected only after a solution is found for the current 
impasse. 
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change is assessed as necessary or useful. As shown above, the approach 
can vary according to the type of constitutional issue in question: the sec-
tor-specifi c issues related to legislative alignment in certain areas of the 
acquis can in principle be distinguished from the general constitutional 
issues related to fi nding the ‘right formula’ for Croatia’s accession to and 
participation in the EU. 
According to the initial analysis, it seems that there are no direct 
obstacles in the Croatian Constitution for Croatia’s accession to the EU. 
However, certain adjustments of the constitutional framework will be 
needed, or, in some cases, as shown above, will at least be advisable: 
1) to remove apparent limitations to achieving the full alignment 
and implementation of the acquis, which could, if unresolved, lead to a 
confl ict of constitutional provisions with the acquis (eg the extradition of 
Croatian nationals on the basis of the European Arrest Warrant); 
2) to ensure the most suitable constitutional legal basis and frame-
work, not only for Croatia’s accession but also for its effective functioning 
as a Member State within the EU. 
The experiences of EU Member States - both old and new - can be 
valuable in this respect. However, as their examples show, there are no 
standard or best solutions - the ‘most appropriate’ solutions undeniably 
depend on a number of legal and political considerations and circum-
stances in each individual country and their respective legal systems. If 
there is perhaps one ‘lesson learned’, it is that it is desirable to have the 
EU accession and membership refl ected in some way in the Constitution 
(eg through specifi c EU clauses or titles), which would, at the same time, 
also take into account further developments in the EU integration proc-
ess.  
In Croatia’s case, during the process of negotiations, the Croatian 
Negotiating Team will gain full insight into the potential constitutional 
changes and issues where a constitutional change may be considered. 
Based on the experience thus far, some constitutional amendments will 
most likely even be demanded from the EU side. First, an expert and then 
a Government, Parliament or joint working group or commission would 
need to be formed to analyse, draft, and recommend possible modifi ca-
tions of the Constitution.   
 Whether, to what extent, and how Croatia ends up adjusting its 
constitutional legal framework for EU accession not only depends on le-
gal considerations, but ultimately on a political decision of the Croatian 
Parliament, which, according to Article 143 of the Constitution, decides 
by a majority vote of all representatives whether or not to start proceed-
ings for the amendment of the Constitution, after a proposal has been 
made by at least 1/5 of parliamentarians, the President or the Govern-
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ment. The decision on actual amendments to the Constitution is made by 
the Parliament by a two-thirds majority vote of all its members. 
Recently, some informal public discussions have taken place in 
Croatia on the potential wider reform of the Croatian Constitution, which 
could also entail constitutional adjustments linked to Croatia’s EU ac-
cession. Expert and academic debates, like the one initiated at the April 
2007 Conference, can be regarded as a valuable contribution to this 
process, laying down the foundations for further deliberations and the 
preparation of appropriate decisions by the responsible authorities and 
institutions in Croatia.  
